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On Environmental, Climate Change &  National Security Law 
Mark Patrick Nevitt 
 
Abstract  
This Article offers a new way to think about climate change.  Two new climate change assessments 
— the 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA) and the United Nations Intergovernmental 
Panel’s Special Report on Climate Change — prominently highlight climate change’s multifaceted national 
security risks.  Indeed, not only is climate change a “super wicked” environmental problem, it also accelerates 
existing national security threats, acting as both a “threat accelerant” and “catalyst for conflict.”  Further, 
climate change increases the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events while threatening nations’ 
territorial integrity and sovereignty through rising sea levels.  It causes both internal displacement within nations 
and climate-change refugees across national borders.  Addressing this new climate-security nexus brings together 
two historically distinct areas of law — environmental law and national security law.  As we properly 
conceptualize climate change as a security threat, environmental law and national security law — once separate 
and often in conflict with each other — engage with each other in new and complex ways.   
The first body, environmental and climate change law, largely values the protection and preservation 
of the human environment via a cooperative federalism model of environmental laws and policies.  The second 
body of law, national security law, largely suspends environmental protections ex ante via myriad national 
security exemptions within existing environmental statutes.  But in the climate-security context, what was once 
in conflict is increasingly aligned as we look to preserve our common future from all threats, however defined.  If 
climate change is properly conceptualized as a security issue, how do these two bodies of law interact?  Should a 
future President be afforded national security deference in addressing the threats posed by climate change?  Is 
climate change potentially a national emergency?  And if so, what actions can (or should) be taken? 
This Article first describes and analyzes climate change as a national security issue, providing an 
overview of our understanding of climate change, climate science, and climate change’s multifaceted security effects.  
Second, I analyze where environmental, climate change, and national security law increasingly intersect to include 
 
 Mark P. Nevitt is a Sharswood Fellow, Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Prior to 
his academic appointment at Penn, he served for 20 years in the Navy as both a naval flight officer and member 
of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps with a focus on environmental law.  In particular, he thanks Professors 
Tim Mulvaney, Holly Doremus, Felix Mormann, Vanessa Casado-Perez, Arden Rowell, Rob Glicksman, Gabriel 
Weil, William Buzbee, Robert V. Percival, Sara Coalengelo, Victor Flatt, Sara Gosman, Jimmy May, Hajin Kim, 
Sebastien Jodion-Pilion, Bridget Fahey, Robin West, Ben Eidelsohn, Michael Gerrard, David Luban, Peter Byrne, 
and faculty workshops at Georgetown Law, Northwestern Law, the Sabin Colloquium on Innovative 
Environmental Scholarship at Columbia Law School, and the first annual “Enviro-Schmooze” at Texas A&M 
Law School for help with this Article.  All mistakes are my own. 
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a discussion of relevant U.S. law.  Finally, I use one specific example — whether climate change is a national 
emergency — as a vehicle to highlight how these two areas of law interact in new and surprising ways. 
Introduction  
 
The rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will continue to harm 
Massachusetts.  The risk of catastrophic harms, though remote, is nevertheless real.1 
 
Our economy is on the line.  Our future is on the line. Lives are on the line.  So let’s call this what 
it is, climate security, a life and death issue for our generation.2 
 
This Article offers a new way to think about climate change.  In light of recent scientific 
studies3 and national security intelligence estimates,4 it is increasingly clear that climate change 
is not just an environmental issue — it is also a complex and multifaceted national security 
issue.  In the face of the world’s collective failure to date to implement policy or legal solutions 
to combat climate change, the world’s most esteemed scientists predict that the physical 
environment will transform in stunning ways.5  Today, the national security and intelligence 
communities in the United States and around the world are also sounding the alarm regarding 
climate change’s national security impacts.6  Yet legal scholarship has yet to adequately address 
this new “climate-security connection” and has not wrestled with the normative outcomes for 
the increasingly overlapping fields of environmental and national security law.  This Article 
fills this ever-widening gap in legal scholarship.7   
 
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). 
2 Pete Buttegieg’s Campaign Speech, Annotated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/us/politics/pete-buttigieg-speech.html  
3 FOURTH NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, SUMMARY FINDINGS 2018 [hereinafter NCA 2018]. Full 
report available online at: nca2018.globalchange.gov.       
4 Daniel R. Coats,  Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 21-23 (Jan. 29, 2019) 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf [hereinafter Intel Report]  
5 UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5°C, (2018) [hereinafter UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT]; See also DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE 
UNINHABITABLE EARTH (2019).  In the United States, cities, states, localities, and industries are making 
international commitments to meet and surpass the commitments made in the Paris Agreement.  Hiroko Tabuchi 
& Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 
2017 at A12.   https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html. 
6 INTEL REPORT, supra note 4.  See also Katherine J. Mach, et al., Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict, 
571 Nature 193; Matt McDonald, Climate Change and Security: Towards Ecological Security? 10 Int’l Theory 153, 154 
(2018); CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 13-18 
(2007), available at https://www.cna.org/reports/climate [hereinafter CLIMATE SECURITY 2007]. 
7 The one notable exception is Professor Sarah Light’s outstanding and innovative scholarly work in 
this area. See, e.g. Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security:  Climate Change, the Military and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1772 (2014); Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879 (2014). See also Benjamin 
Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economics Order, 129 YALE L. J. ____ (2019) (forthcoming) 
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Advances in climate science now forecast an uncertain future, defined by climate 
change’s security impacts.  Indeed, this past year may well have marked a turning point in our 
collective understanding of climate change’s effects and threats.  According to the 2018 United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (UNIPCC) Special Report of 1.5° 
Celsius and the 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA), global mean temperatures 
may rise as high as four degrees Celsius over pre-industrial norms by the end of this century.8  
Climate change threatens national sovereignty and territorial integrity while increasing the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.9  Within the United States, climate change 
will cause massive sea level rise, impacting coastal property rights and destabilizing long-held 
notions of property law.10  The implications are catastrophic for both the physical environment 
and human security.   
In addition, advances in climate attribution science now showcase climate change’s 
impact on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather.  California wildfires recently killed 
85 people, and Hurricanes Dorian, Florence, and Michael ravaged our coastlines. 
Internationally, we are seeing a clear connection between climate change and environmental 
degradation to include drought, famine, and food insecurity.11  Climate change acts as a 
“catalyst for conflict,” undermining political stability — particularly in nations with weak 
governance structures that lack the capacity and resources to adapt.12  Further complicating 
matters, there are no special legal protections for climate-change refugees, who 
 
(showcasing how governments worldwide have adopted national security policies that address “an increasingly 
wide array of risks and vulnerabilities, including climate change”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the 
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010).  
8 UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 5.  The latest report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (UNIPCC) estimates that global warming is likely to reach 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial levels as early as 2030. In the past decade, the earth has witnessed the hottest mean temperatures in 
recorded human history, the opening of new sea-lanes in the Arctic, and an uptick in extreme weather events. Id. 
Climate change is defined as any identifiable change in climate over time “whether due to natural variability or as 
a result of human activity.” Id. 
9 NCA 2018, supra note 3. 
10 See e.g., J. Peter Byrne, A Fixed Rule for a Changing World:  The Legacy of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 53 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1-26 (2018). See also Cary Coglianese & Mark P. Nevitt, Actually, We Are 
Already Paying a Climate Tax, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 24, 2019.  
11 See, e.g., Christopher Flavelle, Climate Change Threatens the World’s Food Supply, United Nations Warns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2019 at A1.   
12 For example, Syria experienced a massive drought exacerbated by climate change, leading to internal 
displacement, civil war, and a massively disruptive refugee crisis.  Discounting climate change’s impact to the 
Syrian operational environment would have negative consequences on the military’s ability to respond.    
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disproportionately hail from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and poorer nations most 
vulnerable to climate change.13   
Yet in response to a series of climate-induced disasters and troubling scientific reports, 
the U.S. and international community stepped backwards.  Nations emitted more carbon 
emissions this past year than at any other year in human history — and that pace is only rising.14   
At the time of this writing, the world lacks a binding legal agreement that will put the world 
back on track to reduce GHG emissions. 15   Even if all the Paris Climate Agreement 
commitments are met, the earth will continue to transform in dramatic ways.16  Exacerbating 
matters, the current U.S. Administration has commenced the process of withdrawing from the 
Paris Agreement and has eliminated any mention of climate change from the most recent 
National Security Strategy.17  Yet it is clear that we are reaching a tipping point for both the 
United States and international community to take collective action to address climate change.  
Indeed, climate change is not just the most important environmental issue of our time — it 
may very well be the most important national security issue of our time.   
The precise consequences of such a dramatic climactic change remain uncertain but 
will surely test existing legal authorities and how we conceptualize different areas of law.  
Specifically, it will force us to re-conceptualize environmental law its underlying relationship 
 
13 See, e.g., Alexander Gillespie, Small Island States in the Face of Climatic Change:  The End of the Line in 
International Environmental Responsibility, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 107 (2004).  
14 Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, We are in trouble: Global Carbon emissions reached a record high in 2018, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2018 https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/05/we-
are-trouble-global-carbon-emissions-reached-new-record-high/  
15 For example, there is no comprehensive climate change legislation in the United States and the Paris 
Climate Accord relies upon a process-driven reporting system. The U.S. is in the process of withdrawing from 
the Paris Climate Accord at this time.  This withdrawal will not be complete until Nov. 4, 2020, one day following 
the 2020 Presidential election.   
16 WALLACE-WELLS, supra note 5. 
17 Further, the current President has previously dismissed climate change as a mere hoax.  “The concept 
of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” 
Donald J. Trump @realDonaldTrump, 11:15AM – Nov. 6, 2012. It wasn’t always this way. In 1991, then-
President Bush assessed that climate change “respects no international boundaries” and contributes to political 
conflict in his 1991 National Security Strategy.  Climate change has been consistently mentioned in national 
security policy guidance since then.  http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1991.pdf See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2015).  
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with national security.18  This is only the beginning of what I call the climate security century where 
climate change will stress, challenge, and destabilize existing legal frameworks.19   
As we conceptualize climate change as a massively destabilizing security threat, two 
different bodies of law — historically distinct and often in conflict — engage and interact with 
each other in novel ways.  The first body of law, environmental law and the emerging field of 
climate change law, largely seek to protect and preserve the human environment via a 
cooperative federalism model of environmental laws and policies.20  The second body of law 
— national security and the related field of emergency law — suspends environmental 
protections in the event of a national emergency declaration or national security 
determination.21  For example, the Clean Air Act, the major U.S. federal environmental law 
that regulates carbon dioxide and other Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions,22 authorizes the 
President to exempt emissions from stationary sources “if it is in the national security interests 
to do so.”23  But what if excessive GHG emissions cause the underlying national security 
threat?  Climate change demands greater environmental protections to reduce GHG emissions, 
regardless of its source.24  In the absence of comprehensive climate legislation, what authorities 
are in place to address the threats posed by climate security?  
This Article addresses these questions and others, proceeding in four parts.  In Part I, 
I first describe, analyze, and contextualize climate change as a national security issue.  This 
includes a descriptive overview of the latest climate change science, intelligence, and security 
 
18 Cf. Jedidiah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of the Possible, Duke Law School Public Law & Legal 
Theory Paper No. 217; Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 28 (Aug. 2008) Available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1259802 (stating that “[c]limate change looks to be more than just another 
environmental problem. It threatens to test the limits of our dominant ways of understanding and solving, not 
just environmental problems, but problems of political economy generally”).     
19 Mark P. Nevitt, Climate Change: Our Greatest National Security Threat?, JUST SECURITY, (Apr. 18, 2019).    
20 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L. J., 975, 988-
89 (2013). 
21 The National Emergency Act of 1976, Public Law 94-412, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651.  Cf. Jules Lobel, 
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385 (1989). 
22 § 111(d), Clean Air Act.   
23 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (i)(4) (2012). 
24 And the national security community is an enormous emitter of GHG emissions. Consider the 
emissions produced by the U.S. military.  In a recent study released last month from by Brown University’s 
Watson Institute and Costs of War project, it estimated that the U.S. Department of Defense emits more GHG 
emissions than many European nations to include Portugal, Sweden, and Denmark.  Indeed, if the U.S. 
Department of Defense was ranked against all the nations of the world, it would be the #55th largest emitter of 
GHG emissions.  See Neta C. Crawford, Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War, BROWN UNIVERSITY 
WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INT’L AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change and 
the Costs of War Final.pdf  [hereinafter COSTS OF WAR]. 
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reports.  In Part II, I analyze where environmental, climate change, and national security law 
increasingly interact to include a discussion of relevant U.S. law. This includes existing 
environmental statutes, and recent climate change litigation.  In Part III, I use one specific 
example — addressing whether climate change is a national emergency — as a vehicle to 
highlight how these two areas of law interact.  I conclude in Part IV by addressing the risks 
and opportunities in conceptualizing climate change as a national security issue.  This Part 
addresses how national security can serve as a powerful information broker and norm 
entrepreneur that can potentially drive resources, influence public perception, collective 
behavior, and action.25  The Article concludes by highlighting the many ways that climate 
security issue shines light on dormant, shared values that have always been beneath the surface 
of both environmentalism and national security.  After all, both areas of law seek to preserve 
the environment and protect the nation from all threats, however defined.   
I. Climate Change:  A Non-Traditional 
National Security Threat 
 
 Environmental law and national security law have historically been treated as two 
different areas of law and, with a few notable exceptions, have rarely been in direct 
conversation with one another.26  No longer.27  In what follows, I describe how climate science 
and the rise of climate intelligence — informed by national security professionals — adds to 
our understanding of climate change’s security impacts.   This Part describes the current state 
of climate science and the increasingly important role that the national security-intelligence 
community plays in climate change’s ongoing debate about its ongoing and future national 
security risks.  Due to recent advances in climate attribution science, a much clearer linkage 
has emerged between human activity, climate change, and extreme weather patterns.28  There 
 
25  See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1257-58 (2001) (describing how 
governmental efforts in World War to encourage recycling for patriotic reasons were largely embraced by the 
American public). 
26 The relationship between environmental law and national security law has always been somewhat 
fraught as the military has sought national security exemptions via existing environmental statutes and through 
exemptions within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  See, e.g.,  Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) 
(upholding military exemptions within environmental law). 
27 Climate science makes clear that we will need to massively reduce GHG emissions from all sources 
and we will need a massive, scalable, energy transformation to secure a more livable future. FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT, UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNIPCC), Summary for 
Policymakers, http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (last visited Aug 1, 2019) [hereinafter FIFTH ASSESSMENT].        
28 See AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, Explaining Extreme Events of 2017 from a Climate Perspective, 
available at:  https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfm/publications/bulletin-of-the-american-meteorological-
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is a continual and evolving conversation between the scientific and intelligence communities 
centered around climate change’s risks.  Specifically, sea level rise, storm surge, and extreme 
weather — all exacerbated by climate change — threaten our territorial integrity, national 
sovereignty in dramatic and fundamental ways.   
A. Climate Science and the Emerging Climate-Security Nexus 
 
Climate change is aptly described by Professor Richard Lazarus as an all-encompassing 
and complex “super-wicked” problem.29  Today’s scientific consensus makes clear that climate 
change is “extremely likely” caused by human activity.30  As discussed below, the UNIPCC’s 
most recent Special Report on climate change and the United States’ Fourth National Climate 
Assessment (NCA) reaffirm what our unhealthy planet already knows — the earth is warming 
at a faster rate than previously estimated, climate change impacts global security in new and 
complex ways, and the window to solve this climate security crisis is rapidly closing.31  Both 
reports showcase climate change’s unmistakable, debilitating effects on global security, while 
simultaneously highlighting that the window to reduce GHG worldwide emissions is shutting.  
1.  The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report 
In 2014, the UNIPCC issued its Fifth Assessment Report, highlighting climate change 
impacts on food security and human security.32  In October 2018, the UNIPCC issued a 
Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
 
society-bams/explaining-extreme-events-from-a-climate-perspective/ (determining that 15 of 16 extreme 
weather events were made more likely by human caused climate change). 
29 Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:  Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).   
30 “Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely 
by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations 
of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their 
effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system 
and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 27. 
31 UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 5.  
32 The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UNIPCC) recently reaffirmed the scientific 
consensus on climate change, emphasizing the need for immediate international action. Id.  In August 2019, the 
UNIPCC issued a new Special Report on “Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land 
Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse gas fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems.”  It stated,  “Climate change, 
including increases in frequency and intensity of extremes, has adversely impacted food security and terrestrial 
ecosystems as well as contributed to desertification and land degradation in many regions (high confidence).”  
UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND (Draft Summary Report 
for Policy Makers) (Aug. 2019). 
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levels. 33   In this Special Report, international climate scientists determined that global 
temperatures are likely to increase 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels as early as 
2030.  The Report also warned that the window to take action to keep global temperatures 
from surpassing this threshold is rapidly closing and we will easily surpass this threshold 
without a dramatic reduction in GHG emissions.34   
There must be a massive worldwide reduction in GHG emissions in order to limit 
global warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius from baseline pre-industrial levels.35  This is 
aligned with the Paris Climate Agreement’s goal of holding global average temperature below 
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels while “pursing efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels.”36  Scientists estimate that global warming 
at or above 2 degrees Celsius beyond preindustrial levels will cause massive economic and 
environmental damage.  Mass migration will take place from the regions most affected by 
climate change.  Domestically, wildfires will burn at least twice as much forest area in the 
western United States than was typically burned by wildfires preceding 2019.37   
The 2018 UNIPCC Special Report stated that absent a dramatic reduction in GHG 
emissions — in the vicinity of forty to seventy percent38 —  the world is well on track to 
surpass both the 1.5 degree Celsius and 2.0 degree Celsius increase.39  Indeed, it is increasingly 
likely that the governing United Nations Framework on Climate Change and international 
legal instruments will fall far short to keep the temperature increase at bay.  Sea-level rise will 
 
33 FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 27.  The report was issued with the aim of “strengthening 
the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.” 
Id. The next comprehensive UNIPCC report is scheduled to be issued in 2022 
34 The report places a level of confidence in each finding as well as the assessed likelihood of an outcome 
or result Id. For example, “virtually certain” indicates a 99-100% probability of an outcome occurring, “very 
likely” indicates a 90-100% probability, and “likely” indicates a 66%-100% outcome. Id.  
35 This will require global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 
percent from 2010 levels by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050.   
36 Paris Agreement, art 2. 
37 See Green New Deal Resolution (Sen. Markey (D-MA) and Rep. Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY)), ¶ 3 (A)-(F).  
The report also notes that at or above 2 degrees Celsius beyond pre-industrialized levels, the earth will lose 99 
percent of all coral reefs, more than 350,000 people will be exposed to heat stress by 2050 and the United States 
risk damage of $1 trillion dollars in public infrastructure and coastal real estate.  The New Green Deal Resolution 
refers to “frontline and vulnerable communities” that will be particularly vulnerable to these effects. See id.    
38 See Rajendara K. Pachaurai & Leo Meyer, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate 
Change 2014:  Synthesis Report:  Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 20 (2015).  See also Kirsten Davies & Thomas Ridell, The Warming 
War:  How Climate Change is Creating Threats to International Peace and Security, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 51 (2017). 
39 The United States is currently the world’s second largest Greenhouse Gas emitter (behind China) and 
has emitted 20 percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions through 2015.  UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-
impacts/science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html (last visited Aug 10, 2019. 
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increase throughout this century and will continue well past 2100 (where many of the climate 
models inexplicably stop).  Significantly, the UNIPCC Special Report reinforces that climate 
change impacts national security: 
Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human 
security, and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 
1.5 degrees Celsius and increase further with 2.0 degrees Celsius.40 
 
The UNIPCC Special Report also found that disadvantaged and vulnerable 
populations are at higher risk of climate change’s adverse consequences, which will 
disproportionately impact Small-Island Developing States and developing countries.41   Finally, 
in the unlikely event that the 2.0-degree Celsius goal is met, climate change will continue to 
intensify extreme weather and undermine national security.  After all, GHG emissions stay in 
the atmosphere for decades after they are emitted.   
2. The Fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA):  Emphasizing Climate 
Change’s National Security Impacts 
 
In November 2018, the U.S. government released the Fourth National Climate 
Assessment (NCA), addressing climate change impacts and risks, with a focus on climate 
change’s impacts in the United States.42  In 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed a law 
requiring that the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) deliver the National 
Climate Assessment to Congress and the President “no less than four years.”43  This report 
must “analyze the effects of global change on the natural environment” and “[the] current 
trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and projects major trends for the 
subsequent 25 to 100 years.”44  Once again the scientific community is sounding the alarm on 
climate change’s national security impacts.  Specifically, the Fourth National Climate 
Assessment states: 
Climate change, variability, and extreme events, in conjunction with other factors, can 
exacerbate conflict, which has implications for U.S. national security. Climate impacts 
already affect U.S. military infrastructure, and the U.S. military is incorporating climate 
risks in its planning.45 
 
 
40 UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 5, at SPM-11. 
41 UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 5. 
42 NCA 2018, supra note 3.       
43 Global Change Research Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101- 606, 104 Stat. 3096-3104, November 16, 
1990. http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-104/pdf/ STATUTE-104-Pg3096.pdf     
44 Id.      
45 NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 107. 
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National security is mentioned fourteen times in its Report in Brief.46   Furthermore, the 
Fourth National Climate Assessment added an entirely new chapter addressing national 
security, U.S. humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief absent that was absent from the Third 
National Climate Assessment.47  The NCA further highlights climate change’s “interconnected 
impacts,” noting that extreme weather and climate-related impacts on one system can result 
in increased risk and failures in other systems to include water resources, food production, 
public health, and national security.48 It states: 
Climate change, variability, and extreme events increase risks to national security 
through direct impacts on U.S. military infrastructure and, more broadly, through the 
relationship.  between climate-related stress on societies and conflict.  Direct linkages 
between climate and conflict are unclear, but climate variability has been shown to 
affect conflict through intermediate processes, including resource competition, 
commodity price shocks, and food insecurity.49 
 
These interconnected impacts are both transnational and transubstantive.  As climate change 
exacerbates food insecurity and water insecurity both inside and outside U.S. borders, there 
exists an increased threat of conflict and displacement that places a stress on migrants fleeing 
food insecurity, drought, and related environmental stressors.50  Climate change can also lead 
to commodity price shocks, increase the risk of infectious diseases, and exacerbate resource 
competition.51 
 Both the UNIPCC and NCA reports showcase how climate change increases the 
intensity and likelihood of extreme weather events.  Indeed, advances in climate attribution 
science demonstrate that the threats posed by climate change increase the likelihood of natural 
disasters. 52  Recently, the American Geophysical Union reported that human-caused climate 
 
46 The NCA states that “[n]atural variability and changes in climate increase risks to our national security 
by affecting factors that can exacerbate conflict and displacement outside of U.S. borders, such as food and water 
insecurity and commodity price shocks. More directly, our national security is impacted by damage to U.S. military 
assets such as roads, runways, and waterfront infrastructure from extreme weather and climate-related events.”  
NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 50.   Contrast this to the U.S.’s most recent National Defense Strategy and National 
Security Strategy, which eliminated any mention of climate change from these important policy documents.   
47 NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 61.  This Chapter is titled “Climate Effects on U.S. International Interests.”  
48 NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 13-14. 
49 NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 606. 
50  For example, Guatemala recently suffered a severe food drought and shortage. Gena Steffens, 
Changing Climate Forces Desperate Guatemalans to Migrate, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 23, 2018.  
51 NCA 2018, supra note 3, at 108. 
52 See AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, Explaining Extreme Events of 2017 from a Climate Perspective,  
available at:  https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/index.cfm/publications/bulletin-of-the-american-meteorological-
society-bams/explaining-extreme-events-from-a-climate-perspective/ (finding that 15 of 16 extreme weather 
events were made more likely by human caused climate change). 
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change increased both the likelihood and severity of 15 of 16 extreme weather events in 2017.53  
As climate scientists refine their models, we will likely be able to predict with greater certainty 
the future likelihood of extreme weather events and better pinpoint their size and location.   
In addition, climate change’s costs are staggering — and only increasing.  The Office 
of Management and Budget recently estimated that the federal government spent over $300 
million in direct costs to address extreme weather events and fires alone in the past decade.54  
And between 1980 and 2013, the United States suffered over $260 billion dollars in flood 
damage.55  According to one leading insurance firm, natural disasters cost the world an average 
of $184 billion per year and 106,000 lives.56  Climate-driven weather events also threaten the 
infrastructure at our military bases and harm military readiness, discussed in greater detail 
below. 57  Finally, independent of these two reports, GHG emissions have actually been 
increasing — following a decrease in GHG emissions in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, 
they are once again on the rise.58 
The UNIPCC Special Report and NCA scientific reports have caught the eye of a 
more mainstream publishing audience.  At a 2-degree Celsius rise above pre-industrial levels 
— which we are on track to meet and surpass — author David Wallace-Wells foreshadows 
the world that we may well inhabit by 2050 in The Uninhabitable Earth: 
As temperatures rise, this could mean many of the biggest cities in the Middle East 
and South Asia would become lethally hot in summer, perhaps as soon as 2050. There 
would be ice-free summers in the Arctic and the unstoppable disintegration of the 
West Antarctic’s ice sheet, which some scientists believe has already begun, threatening 
the world’s coastal cities with inundation. Coral reefs would mostly disappear. And 
there would be tens of millions of climate refugees, perhaps many more, fleeing 
droughts, flooding and extreme heat, and the possibility of multiple climate-driven 
natural disasters striking simultaneously.59 
 
53 See id.  
54 U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (2016). 
55 Alice Hill, Threat Multiplier:  Exploring the National Security and Policy Implications of Climate Change, 28 
GEO. ENVT’L L. REV. ONLINE 1, (2015). 
56 Id. at 4.  Pacific Gas & Electric recently declared bankruptcy in the face of massive California wildfires 
with at least some commentator speculating that this was the U.S. economy’s first “climate bankruptcy.”  See Ian 
Gray & Gretchen Bakke, Pacific Gas and Electric is a company that was just bankrupted by climate change. It won’t be the 
last, WASH. POST, Jan 30, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2019/01/30/pacific-gas-and-electric-is-a-company-that-was-just-bankrupted-by-climate-change-it-
wont-be-the-last/ 
57 Mark P. Nevitt, Pentagon’s Climate Change Report Lacks Analysis Law Requires, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 23, 
2019). 
58 Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, We are in trouble: Global Carbon emissions reached a record high in 2018, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2018 https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/12/05/we-
are-trouble-global-carbon-emissions-reached-new-record-high/ 
59 Wallace-Wells, supra note 5, at 10.  
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B. National Security & Intelligence Communities: Increasingly in Conversation with Climate 
Scientists 
 
Just as climate scientists have increasingly articulated the future threats and risks posed 
by climate change, national security professionals have increasingly integrated the best 
available science into their intelligence reports, policy pronouncements, and governing 
analysis.  There is now a continually ongoing, two-way conversation between the scientific and 
security communities as  the national security and intelligence communities continually sound 
the alarm on climate change’s multifaceted national security threats. 60   Today, the CIA, 
national security and broader intelligence community are now actively engaging with the latest 
climate science, to include the UNIPPC and NCA.61   Further, with one recent, notable 
exception, climate change has been mentioned in every Presidential National Security Strategy 
(NSS) since 1991.62   
As discussed below, this rise of climate security and climate intelligence has the 
potential to drive national strategy, operations, public perceptions, and existing resources.63  
While the current Administration’s EPA is actively dismantling domestic environmental and 
climate regulations, climate security remains “sticky” and durable, keeping climate change in 
 
60 See Bishop Garrison, The President’s Constitutional Responsibility to Confront Climate Change and Invest in 
Renewable Energy for National Security, 45 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 671 (2018) (asserting that the Commander in Chief 
clause places an affirmative duty on the President to combat climate change as the “decision-maker for all military 
actions”).  I don’t take a position on whether this emerging “climate security” field is distinct or a “Law of the 
Horse,” but I argue that it is a vastly undertheorized field that is deserving of more attention for several reasons. 
Despite these earlier pronouncements from the President, DoD, scientists and intelligence community, the 
threats posed by climate change were completely omitted as a national security threat in the latest National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). It wasn’t always this way.  In 1991, then-President 
George Bush assessed that climate change “respects no international boundaries” and contributes to political 
conflict in his 1991 National Security Strategy.  U.S. NAT’L SECURITY STRATEGY (1991). 
61 William Broad, CIA is Sharing Data with Climate Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010.  The term climate 
change has been placed in every National Security Strategy (NSS) since the first Bush Administration. 
Unfortunately, the term climate change was dropped from the 2017 National Security Strategy. 
62 Climate change was not directly addressed in the 2017 National Security Strategy issued by President 
Trump.  As far back as 1990, the military has addressed the security implications of global climate change. See 
Terry Kelly, Global Climate Change, Implications for the United States Navy, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1990) (on file 
with author). 
63 Intelligence is defined as the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, 
interpretation, analysis of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces 
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.  DOD DICTIONARY, infra note 92, at 114 (emphasis 
provided). “One role of the intelligence community is the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information 
about threats to national security.”  NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 489 2016 (DYCUS, BERNEY, BANKS, RAVEN-
HANSEN, VLADECK ED.). 
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the public and congressional eye.64  Even under the current Administration, which has rolled 
back previous climate initiatives, new legislation on climate has been recently enacted through 
the national security appropriations process.  For example, the 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act prohibited military construction in the 100-year floodplain — an important 
climate adaptation measure that passed a Republican-controlled Congress and was signed by 
President Trump.65   The 2019 defense spending bill required the Department of Defense to 
provide a report ranking the military installations most vulnerable to climate change.  This 
year, Congress has held multiple congressional hearings from scientists and experts to better 
understand the national security risks posed by climate change.  
Consider, too, how the intelligence communities have recently and steadily warned of 
the threats posed by climate change.  In 2008, the George W. Bush administration produced 
a National Intelligence Estimate, first addressing the effects of climate change on national 
security.66  In 2010, the Director of National Intelligence stated: 
We continue to assess that global climate change will have wide-ranging implications 
for U.S. national security interests over the next 20 years because it will aggravate 
existing world problems – such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, 
ineffectual leadership, and weak political institutions.67 
 
In 2015, President Obama signed the federal Climate Action Plan, requiring federal 
agencies to report on climate change’s impacts and directing DoD to assess the vulnerability 
of its coastal facilities.68  This was followed up by a 2016 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
that incorporated the findings from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (UNIPCC) Fifth Assessment into its report, highlighting projected trends in extreme 
 
64 Recent national defense authorization acts signed by President Trump have addressed climate change 
measures at military installations.  The pending Intelligence Authorization Act before Congress has a provision 
establishing a new “Climate Security Fusion Center.” (draft legislation on file with author). 
65 Shana Udvardy, New Defense Bill Strengthens the Militaries Flood Readiness, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, Aug 7, 2018, https://blog.ucsusa.org/shana-udvardy/new-defense-bill-strengthens-the-militarys-
flood-readiness-and-saves-taxpayer-dollars-all-while-addressing-climate-change  
66 National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 
2030:  Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence and the House Select Comm. on 
Intelligence and the House Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. 2-3 
(2008)(statement for the record of Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director, National Intelligence for Analysis and 
Chairman, National Intelligence Council (noting that climate change “will have wide-ranging implications for US 
national security interests over the next 20 years”).  
67 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf  
68 The President’s Climate Action Plan, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 
2019). 
44 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ___ (2020) (forthcoming) – DRAFT  
 14 
weather events that are exacerbated by climate change.69  The 2016 National Intelligence 
Assessment outlined six wide-ranging national security challenges (“possible pathways”) for 
the United States and other countries over the next 20 years:  (1) threats to the stability of 
countries; (2) heightened social and political tension; (3) adverse effects on food prices and 
availability; (4) increased risks to human health; (5) negative impacts of investments and 
economic competitiveness; and (6) potential climate discontinuities and “secondary 
surprises.”70     
In 2019, the United States’ Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
issued a new threat assessment report, stating that the “negative effects of environmental 
degradation and climate change” will impact human security, threaten public health, and lead 
to historic levels of human displacement within and across borders.71  It further noted:  
global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely 
to fuel competition for resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 
2019 and beyond.  Climate hazards such as extreme weather, higher temperatures, 
droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise, soil degradation, and acidifying 
oceans are intensifying, threatening infrastructure, health, and water and food 
security.72 
 
In sum, the national security and intelligence communities, which have historically 
focused on traditional security threats such as aggression and inter-state conflict, now address 
non-traditional security threats such as environmental security and climate change.73  This 
literature must be read in conjunction with the National Climate Assessment, UNIPCC 
reports, and related scientific reports.  While national security and intelligence reports are not 
immune to criticism, they have remained fairly durable and are somewhat (but not entirely) 
protected from the politicization of climate science. 74   After all, the military enjoys a 
 
69 The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UNIPCC) recently reaffirmed the scientific 
consensus on climate change, emphasizing the need for immediate international action. Fifth Assessment Report, 
UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNIPCC), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (last visited Aug 1, 2018). 
70 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, Implications for U.S. National Security of Anticipated Climate 
Change, Sep 21, 2016. 
71 DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (ODNI), Statement for the Record:  
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community, Jan. 29, 2019, available at:  
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf  
72 Id.  
73 For a discussion of what is meant by national security and its evolving definition, see Sanford Gaines, 
Sustainable Development & National Security, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 345-52 (2006). 
74  Following the release of the 2019 National Intelligence Threat Assessment, there were efforts made 
by the Trump Administration to block reports on climate change and national security by governmental experts.  
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comparably high approval rating among the American public (especially when compared to 
Congress).  As discussed below, the national security and intelligence community can serve as 
a powerful validator of the most pressing security threats facing the nation and the world.75  
But embracing the security community by climate and environmental advocates comes with 
its own risk.  And national security is such a broadly defined term that it can be wielded in a 
manner that may undermine the underlying goal to minimize GHG emissions.  For example, 
in 2018 Secretary of Energy Rick Perry argued that national security required the continual 
operation of coal-fired powered plants.76 
II. Environmental Law, Climate Change, and  
National Security Values 
 
A. Environmental and Climate Change Law’s Values 
Environmental law is a relatively new field of law, with origins in tort and property 
law.77  Environmental law is generally characterized as an area of positive law, as evidenced by 
the large body of statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions interpreting the legislation.78 
Environmental law largely seeks to protect and preserve the human environment via 
a cooperative federalism model of environmental laws and policies.79  Professor Lazarus in 
Making of Environmental Law explains that environmental values include the embracing of 
science, appreciation of all life forms, a concern with the quality of human life and health, a 
global rather than a nationalist view, and sense of urgency regarding the survival of life on 
 
See Rod Schoonover, The White House Blocked My Report on Climate Change and National Security, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 
2019 at A31.  
75 Intelligence reports are necessarily produced by individual countries — there is not an international 
intelligence report that is akin to the UNIPCC.  NATO, however, has routinely highlighted the importance of 
environmental security matters, to include climate change. See also Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security:  Climate 
Change, the Military and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1797 (2014). 
76 https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/15/rick-perry-coal-rescue-trump-850528  
77 Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213 (2004).   In 
this Article, Professor Tarlock proposes five candidate principles of environmental law to include “minimize 
uncertainty before and as you act.” 
78 Tarlock, supra note 76, at 231 n.64 (2004) (finding that the “simplest definition of positivism is enacted 
law.”).  See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field:  An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
221, 264-71 (2010) (describing environmental law as encompassing to characteristics:  (1) physical public 
resources; and (2) pervasive interrelatedness.  In addition, Professor Aagaard addresses scientific uncertainty.  
The very term “environmental law” did not even exist prior to 1969.  See also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47 (2004).  Scholars generally note that the first major environmental case heard by 
the Supreme Court did not occur until 1965.  See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d. 608 
(1965). The first major environmental federal environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act, was 
signed into law in 1970.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2012).  
79 For an overview of the history of environmental law and its corresponding values, see RICHARD 
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004). 
44 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ___ (2020) (forthcoming) – DRAFT  
 16 
earth.80  It also values a strong sense of urgency regarding the survival of life on earth.81  
Environmental law places a strong emphasis on sustainability, has a revulsion toward waste, 
values a long-term time horizon, and an enduring interest in environmental justice.82   
Scholars have labeled the term environmental as “so all-encompassing that it has been 
robbed of any operative meaning; it needs contours.”83  Within the United States, the Clean 
Air Act currently forms the statutory legal basis for the regulation of GHG emissions.84  In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to 
regulate GHG emissions in the event that it forms a “judgment” that such emissions 
contribute to climate change, and that the State of Massachusetts had standing to challenge 
the agency’s failure to do so.85  At issue was the loss of sovereign Massachusetts land due to 
coastal erosion and sea level rise.86   Following Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA issued an 
endangerment finding and later took steps to regulate GHG emissions.87  
  In recent years, legal scholarship has increasingly wrestled with an offshoot of 
environmental law — climate change law.88  Until recently much of the emphasis within 
climate change law has focused on climate mitigation measures —  the reduction of GHG 
emissions to stem anthropogenic climate change.  The development of law and scholarship 
concerning adapting to climate change and responding to extreme weather events ex post has 
largely lagged the climate mitigation discussion.89  But this, too, has begun to change.  For 
example, in the aftermath of an inadequate governmental response following Hurricane 
 
80 Id.  
81 See, e.g., ROBERT PAEHLKE, ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, 
137-145 (1989). 
82 Id.  
83 Tarlock, supra note 76, at 221.  
84 This authority for the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and related GHG emissions derived from the 
seminal Supreme Court case, Massachusetts v. EPA,  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
85 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
86 Id.   
87 The Clean Power Plan was released shortly thereafter, the central regulatory action by the Obama 
Administration to address climate change. Unfortunately, this effort was stalled by the Supreme Court in 2015 
and the Trump Administration is currently in the process of repealing the Clean Power Plan. See, e.g.,  JAMES E. 
MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.  RECONSIDERING THE CLEAN POWER PLAN (2017). 
88 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L. J., 975, 988-89 (2013). 
89 One of the notable exceptions includes the work of Professors Dan Farber and Rob Verchick.  See 
DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d 
ed. 2010). Other scholars have begun to draw linkages between climate change and human rights law.  See also  
John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights Law and Climate Change at the United Nations, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 
(2009) (describing the human rights implications of climate change on small island developing states); Lisa Grow 
Sun and RonNell Anderson Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, 60 UCLA L. REV. 884, 917-18 (2013). 
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Katrina, Professors Dan Farber and Rob Verchick published a casebook on disaster law, 
connecting broader environmental stressors with disaster response.90   
 Internationally, climate adaptation efforts also largely took a back seat to climate 
mitigation efforts until the United Nations Conference of Parties in Bali in 2007.  It was 
assumed that “the impacts of climate change would arise slowly over time and could be dealt 
with piecemeal, as they emerged.”91  Indeed, until recently policymakers and scholars believed 
that we had considerably more time to adapt to climate change’s effects.  In addition, adaption 
measures were once anathema to many climate advocates — to include former Vice- President 
Al Gore, who worried that focusing on adaptation would reinforce “the terrible moral 
consequences . . . of delay.”92   
  Scientists and policy makers recognize that time is no longer on our side, particularly 
when it comes to the national security impacts of climate change.  As we need to adapt and 
prepare for climate change today, we must take into account climate change’s wide-ranging 
national security impacts. The renewed focus on climate change’s national security impacts 
reflects the broader trend of opening the “climate aperture” beyond mitigation measures to 
encompass its effects on adaptation, human rights, disaster response, and national security.   
B. National Security Law:  An Ever-Expanding Area of Law Increasingly in Conversation 
with Climate Change 
 
  The term “national security” is not well defined in law and remains a multifaceted and 
expanding concept. 93   National security is understood to broadly encompasses whatever 
 
90 Id. See also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 87, at 988-89.   
91 Ian Burton, Beyond Borders:  The Need for Strategic Global Adventures, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV. 
(Dec. 2008). 
92 AL GORE, EARTH IN BALANCE (1992). 
93 National security is not defined in law but is defined within joint military doctrine.  It includes “A 
collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose 
of gaining . . .[a] military or defense advantage over any foreign nation . . . [a] favorable foreign relations position 
. . . [a] defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt 
or covert.”  JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS  162 (Nov 2010) 
[hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY].  The linkage between environmental security and national security was first 
acknowledged in the 1995 National Security Strategy signed by President William J. Clinton. (“Not all security 
risks are [immediate or] military in nature.  Transnational phenomena such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows also have security 
implications for both present and long-term American policy.  In addition, an emerging class of transnational 
environmental issues are increasingly affecting international stability and consequently will present new challenges 
to U.S. strategy.”) NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT (Feb. 1995), at 1.  
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threatens to significantly degrade the quality of life of the people.94   At the time of the nation’s 
founding, national security centered around notions of the common defense.  For example, in 
his earliest pronouncements of a strong federal government, Alexander Hamilton articulated 
a common defense rationale for the federal government.  He conceived the purpose of the 
Union as for “the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as 
well as against internal convulsions as external attacks . . .”95  In doing so, he argued that a 
broad range of threats may ultimately arise and the new nation must be prepared to respond.96  
At its core, the field of national security encompasses use of force matters to include 
defending the nation from an armed attack.97  It includes “defense of national territory and 
welfare against external threats, especially threats of military or quasi-military attack.” 98  
National security is associated with “military defense of a sovereign territory from any foreign 
threat.”99  Historically, that foreign threat has included other nation states but has evolved to 
encompass non-state actors and so called non-traditional security threats.     
Earlier Supreme Court rulings focused on “national defense” and addressed 
congressional and executive authority over war powers and foreign affairs.100  Gradually, the 
term common defense evolved to “national security.”101  During World War II, Harvard 
Professor Pendleton Herring chaired the Committee of Records of the War Administration, 
publishing the U.S. government’s official account of the war and later authoring the National 
 
94 Relatedly, the more generalized term “security” remains a slippery, vague and undertheorized concept. 
See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (2012) (noting that political actors with 
divergent ideological commitments defend the often-competing goals of security). 
95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).  
96 “[The common defense authorities] ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to 
foresee or define the extent of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them.”  Id..  
97 See Light, supra note 75, at 1797.  For example, President Trump has characterized trade as a national 
security issue. 
98 See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on National Security, Feb. 26, 1986, available at 
http://reagan2020.us/speeches/address_on_national_security.asp.  Sanford Gaines, Sustainable Development and 
National Security, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 345-46 (2006). 
99  See, e.g., Rodrigo Alberto Vazquez Martinez, Environmental Security and the Role of Law, 32, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873500 Elizabeth L. Chaleckiat, Environmental Security: A Guide to the Issues 
(ABC-CLIO, 2013) 5–14 Jutta Brunnee, ‘Environmental Security in the Twenty-First Century: New Momentum for the 
Development of International Environmental Law?’, 18 Fordham Int’l L. J. (1994–1995) 1742–1747 at 1742.   
100 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1968) (“[T]his concept of “national defense” 
cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. 
Implicit in the term “national defense” is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set the Nation 
apart.”). 
101 See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security:  Climate Change, the Military and Society, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1772, 1797 (2014). 
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Security Act.102  Professor Herring argued that international affairs had become domestic 
problems, invoking a term — “national security” — that mirrored the Great Depression 
discourse of “economic security.”103  National security law focuses on safeguarding the nation 
and responding to emerging threats.  It seeks to protect and preserve national interests, uphold 
sovereign interests, and protect the lives of its military members and citizens.  Within the 
national security infrastructure resides the military, which has a deep planning culture designed 
and equipped to prepare for future conflicts and threats — however defined.104   
The “classical national security” view encompasses the defense of national territory 
and welfare against external threats, especially threats of military or quasi-military attack.105  
“New-Age” or neo-classical national security is unanchored from this definition and embraces 
and encompasses elements of the classical definition as well as environmental security. The 
challenges posed by climate change represent this next evolution.106 
The modern field of national security law now includes traditional and non-traditional 
threats.  It is best understood as a multifaceted concept rather than a monolithic one.107  As 
such, the concept of national security has continued to evolve from purely military/strategic 
concerns to environmental concerns.108  Indeed, scholars and policy experts have begun to 
incorporate environmental concerns into broader conceptions of national security, exclaiming 
that climate change is a catalyst for conflict.109  Scholars and policy experts have begun to 
incorporate environmental concerns into broader conceptions of national security.110 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively address international 
law and UN Security Council’s growing interest and engagement in climate change, a parallel 
trend has emerged outside the United States as international security institutions are 
 
102 For an account of Professor Herring’s role in the development of the term national security, see 
generally Rana, supra note 93, at 1458-62. 
103 PENDLETON HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR 15-16 (1941); Rana, supra note 93, at 1462. 
104 See generally STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 185-86 (1996).  
105 See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on National Security, Feb. 26, 1986.   
106 This has not been without some controversy.  The current Administration has recently established a 
National Security Working Group to analyze the recent National Climate Assessment that declared climate 
change a national security issue.  See Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey, and Brady Dennis, Latest Plan to Take Aim at 
Climate Consensus, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2019 at A1.  
107 See, e.g., Light, supra note 75, at 1798. 
108 Id. at 1798. 
109 Id. at 1798. 
110 Id. at 1798. 
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increasingly engaged with non-traditional security threats. 111   Consider how the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), the entity entrusted with the responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security, has expanded its definition of threats to international peace 
and security.112  Since the end of the Cold War, the UNSC has shown an increased willingness 
to address non-traditional threats to international peace and security beyond aggression and 
inter-state conflict.  This includes terrorism, health crisis (such as the Ebola and AIDS), and 
other matters of environmental and ecological security.  The United Nations Security Council 
has also convened several high-level meetings addressing climate change as a security issue.  
While it has not yet declared climate change a threat to international peace and security, the 
UN Security Council has shown a willingness to address the security impacts of climate change 
within recent Security Council Resolutions. 
National security threats have grown in recent years to encompass “whatever threatens 
to significantly degrade the quality of life of the people.” 113   Environmental threats—
particularly the threats posed by climate change — satisfy this capacious definition.  And this 
is increasingly recognized by the Defense Department, intelligence communities, and massive 
national security apparatus..   
C. Environmental Law and National Security:  From Conflict to Alignment? 
 
Other scholars have accurately described national security as a public good akin to 
clean air and water:  “it is a classic public good that is too costly and unwieldy for individuals 
to provide for themselves, and it is impossible to exclude individuals from enjoying it once it 
is provided.”114  Climate change’s security challenges represent this continual evolution.115 
Due to advances in climate attribution science, climate security’s effects are 
increasingly real and all-encompassing.  Consider extreme weather’s damage inflicted upon 
national security infrastructure at Tyndall Air Force Base and Camp Lejeune following the 
 
111 U.N. CHARTER, art. 24.  For an outstanding overview of many of the potential tools available to the 
UN Security Council in addressing climate change, see CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
(Shirley V. Scott & Charlotte Ku ed., Edward Elgar) (2018) [hereinafter CLIMATE SECURITY]; Pierre Thielberger, 
Climate Change and International Peace and Security:  Time for a Green Security Council? In FROM COLD WAR TO CYBER 
WAR (H.J. Heintze & P. Thielberger eds) (2016). 
112 U.N. CHARTER, art. 39. 
113 Dycus, supra note 11, at 3.  
114 Light, supra note 75, at 1797. 
115 This has not been without some controversy.  The current Administration has recently established a 
National Security Working Group to analyze the recent National Climate Assessment that declared climate 
change a national security issue.  See Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey, and Brady Dennis, Latest Plan to Take Aim at 
Climate Consensus, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2019 at A1.  
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2018 hurricane season.116  Moreover, climate security has both a domestic and international 
dimension with implications for environmental justice; for example, the world must address 
climate change refugees, many of whom are fleeing environmental degradation in developing 
countries.   
The field of environmental security predates climate security.  It recognizes that 
environmental degradation and our race to use natural resources can undermine international 
peace and security.117  State and non-state actor threats are largely exogenous while the threats 
posed by climate change are both exogenous and endogenous.  And these climate-
environmental threats serve as both a threat-accelerant to existing environmental stressors and 
a catalyst for conflict as states struggle with food and water insecurity exacerbated by climate 
change.118  
Climate change acts as a threat accelerant to existing environmental stressors.  There 
is no longer a direct conflict between national security and environmental law.   Climate 
security concerns will require a role reversal and a rethinking of the historically combative 
relationship between national security and environmental law. 
Environmental statues have have historically been at odds with national security values 
and objectives. 119   Within the major environmental statutes, Congress has carved out 
exemptions for national security activities that are in the “paramount interest of the United 
States.”120  For example, the Clean Air Act delegates legal authority to the EPA to regulate 
GHG emissions.   However, within the same statutory framework, Congress has also delegated 
to the President the authority to exempt any emission source of any “department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the executive branch from compliance with such a requirement if he 
determines to be in the paramount interest to do so.”121 
Scholars such as Professors Babcock and Dycus have highlighted the numerous ways 
in which national security concerns are in conflict with the environmental values discussed 
 
116 It is estimated that the cost of this clean-up will exceed several billion dollars.  
117 See, e.g., Rodrigo Alberto Vazquez Martinez, Environmental Security and the Role of Law, 31-32, available 
at:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873500  
118  MILITARY ADVISORY BD., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE 
ACCELERATING RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2014).  
119 See Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws:  A Clear and Present Danger?,  25 VA. 
ENVTL. L. J. 105 (2007). 
120 See generally Mark P. Nevitt, Defending the Environment:  A Mission for the World’s Militaries, 36 HAW. L. 
REV. 27 (2014) (describing how the domestic environmental laws apply to the largest militaries of the world).  
121 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (b). 
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above.122  For example, energy and defense officials have sought to suspend environmental 
protections in the event of national emergency or for reasons of national security.123  There 
was an uptick in such requests in the aftermath of 9/11.   
Consider, too, how environmental laws values are implemented via positive law, and 
how these values may at times be in tension with underlying national security objectives.  For 
example, the Clean Air Act’s underlying, value-based goal is to protect human health, welfare, 
and the environment.   Under the Clean Air Act, environmental protections are suspended for 
reasons of national security or when the President determines that it is in the “paramount 
interest” of the United States to do so.124  In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), which is often the vehicle for challenging agency actions when an environmental 
statute lacks a citizen-suit provision, exempts “military or foreign affairs” functions from 
rulemaking.125  The Clean Air Act authorizes the President to suspend his or her authority in 
the name of national security: 
The President may exempt any stationary source from compliance with any standard 
or limitation under this section for a period of not more than 2 years if the President 
determines that the technology to implement such standard is not available and that it 
is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.126 
 
But as we better understand the relationship between GHG emissions and climate 
change’s security impacts, we will need a massive reduction of GHG emissions to keep global 
mean temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius.  Climate change demands greater environmental 
protections, particularly from the military which is an enormous emitter of GHG emissions.127 
Indeed, in one recent study, the U.S. military emitted more GHG emissions than many sizable 
European nations.128   
Further, a temporal tension exists between perceived short-term benefits and climate 
change’s pernicious, long-term costs.  Short-term environmental exemptions may be sought 
 
122 See id. at 107 (highlighting the post 9/11 tension between “the safety and continuation of the 
Republic and other values we hold dear, among them a healthy environment”). See also Steven Dycus, Osama’s 
Submarine:  National Security and Environmental Protection after 9/11, 30 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 6 
(2005). 
123 See, e.g., Steven Dycus, Osama’s Submarine:  National Security and Environmental Protection after 9/11, 30 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
124 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
125 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(1).  Further, it does not include “military authority exercised in the field in time of 
war or occupied territory” in its definition of agency. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (G). 
126 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (i)(4). 
127 COSTS OF WAR, supra note 24. 
128 Id.  
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for what is perceived to be a short-term national security benefit.  But this has long-term 
negative implications for both the environment and national security.   GHG emissions remain 
in the atmosphere for a long period of time, exacerbating climate change’s effects and serving 
as a long-term threat to international peace and security.  For that reason, any request for an 
environmental national security exemption under the Clean Air Act has the effect of 
potentially undermining the long-term security situation.  In the face of this temporal tension 
and the nature of anthropogenic climate change, lawmakers should rethink this existing 
environmental exemption within the Clean Air Act, refining what is meant by “paramount 
interest” and either doing away with this exemption or raising the standard to receive one.   
In addition, national security has a far different origin story when compared to 
environmental law.  National security law has largely developed “top down” — it is the historic 
province of policy elites and institutions at the federal and international level.  Indeed, the 
National Security Act created the modern, massive Department of Defense apparatus and 
Central Intelligence Agency. Both have enormous budgets and the Department of Defense is 
the largest employer in the world.  Under the Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA) of 2004, a civilian Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) lies at the 
top of a sprawling intelligence hierarchy.129  States and localities have historically played a more 
limited role with critical national security functions — raising Armies, declaring war, 
concluding treaties — entrusted to the federal government via the Constitution.  For example, 
within the United States, the federal armed force dwarfs the size of state National Guards.  In 
contrast, environmental law has emerged from the “bottom-up” — the result of grassroots 
organizing, advocacy, and the desire for environmental change from a diverse coalition of 
students, engaged citizen-environmentalists, scientists, and organizers.130 
Climate change has stressed and will continue to stress this federal, more top-down 
model.  Extreme weather fueled by climate change will place an increasing burden on disaster 
response at the state and local levels.  States have historically played a leading role in 
environmental matters while cities and localities have recently taken a leadership role in 
sustainability and climate mitigation efforts in the face of White House and EPA indifference 
(or outright hostility).  
 
129 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (“IRTPA”), Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 
6603, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004)  
130 See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47 (2004).  RACHEL 
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
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In many ways, the ongoing dialogue between the environmental and national security 
communities is a long overdue acknowledgement of the shared values between the two areas 
that have always been present.  National security and protecting the environment both 
ultimately share the same goals of ensuring our well-being and preserving our rich national 
heritage.131  This has important consequences for separation of powers as the President has 
been granted much greater deference in national security matters. 
In fact, national security law and environmental law share many commonalities that 
have always existed, albeit just below the surface.  Climate change is forcing us to think about 
the core normative values underlying these fields of law, which are both are fairly new.  
National security planners and policymakers bring a risk-based approach in their planning for 
future threats, not unlike the precautionary principle, a common thread that runs through 
much if environmentalism and natural resource management.  And national security 
policymakers routinely plan for “known unknowns” — threats that we know may exist at a 
fundamental level but about which we seek greater certainty.132   As we look ahead, climate 
change is the ultimate “known unknown” —  we know that the earth is warming, but we are 
uncertain about how much the Earth will warm, where and when weather extremes might 
occur and whether tipping points will, in fact, occur.133 
When commenting on the nature of the threat posed by climate change, retired 
Admiral James Stavridis (former four-star  NATO and European Commander) stated: 
What makes climate change so pernicious is that while the effects will only become 
more catastrophic far down the road, the only opportunity to fix the problem rests in 
the present . . . waiting “to be sure climate change is real” condemns us to a highly 
insecure future if we make the wrong bet.134 
 
In addition, national security and environmental law both require constant and 
continuous updates to ensure they are receiving the best science, facts, and intelligence.  This 
fact and data driven approach drives much of the decision-making process.  Environmental 
law places a heavy emphasis on science and the need to reduce inevitable “uncertainty through 
the constant generation and application of new knowledge. 135  National security 
decisionmakers place a high emphasis on intelligence and fact-finding; they are constantly 
 
131 Id.  
132 See William B. Gall, Climate’s Troubling Unknown Unknowns, N.Y. TIMES at A23 (Apr. 23, 2019). 
133 Id.  
134 James Stavridis, America’s Most Pressing Threat?  Climate Change, BLOOMBERG OPINION, Jan. 11, 2018. 
135 Tarlock, supra note 76, at 220.   
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updating their intelligence and facts to reduce risk.  Intelligence seeks to minimize uncertainty 
before taking action.136  Environmental law takes a risk-based approach that can lead to a 
prohibition of an activity.137  Similarly, national security planners are routinely evaluating and 
weighing the risks facing the nation.138 
D. Shared Values?:  Sea Level Rise, Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty   
  Consider, for example, how both environmental and national law uphold sovereignty 
as a core value.  National security law focuses on safeguarding the nation and responding to 
emerging threats, however defined.  It seeks to protect and preserve national interests, uphold 
sovereign interests, and protect the lives of its military members and citizens.  National security 
law has historically emphasized national sovereignty and the protection of territorial integrity.   
Climate change, too, is threatening our territorial integrity and sovereignty as ice sheets melt, 
sea levels rise, and coastal erosion occurs. 
 Climate-change litigation demonstrates, in part, this convergence of values, 
particularly as it relates to sovereignty and territorial integrity.  In what follows, I highlight  
three climate change cases all of which share core values with both environmental and national 
security law.    
1.  Massachusetts v. EPA (2004)  
  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act authorizes the 
EPA to regulate GHG emissions in the event that it forms a “judgment” that such emissions 
contribute to climate change.139  At issue was the loss of sovereign Massachusetts land due to 
coastal erosion and sea level rise.140  In doing so, the Court found standing for the state litigants 
based upon climate change’s pernicious impact on sea level rise that Justice Stephens 
highlighted the “sovereign prerogatives” that are surrendered when a state entered the 
Union.141  These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal government.  Hence, 
 
136  Cf. Tarlock, supra note 76, at 248-53 (highlighting the five candidate principles to structure 
environmental decision processes) 
137 Tarlock, supra note 76, at 253-54 (proposing five “candidate principles” of environmental law). See 
also Tracy Hester et al, Restating Environmental Law, 40 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 1 (2015) (finding that environmental 
law “embodies an accumulation of complex legal and policy decision intended to protect human health and the 
environment . . .).   
138 Professor Holly Doremus identifies four distinctive features of environmental law that make it 
especially intractable to include “high level of uncertainty” — yet another feature shared with national security 
law, which must also assess future risks in a highly uncertain world. Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and 
Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 295, 318-19 (2003).  
139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
140 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).  
141 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
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the Court found that Massachusetts had “special solicitude” in the standing analysis.  Congress 
has ordered EPA — a federal agency — to protect Massachusetts from air pollutants that 
“cause or contribute to air pollution, which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”142  In the Court’s injury analysis, the Court relied upon scientific experts’ 
testimony that global warming is causing sea levels to rise, “swallow[ing] Massachusetts’ coastal 
land.”143  Further, the severity of injury will only increase over time. 
  In ruling for Massachusetts, Justice Stevens highlighted that Massachusetts is not a 
“normal litigant.” It surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives, foreign affairs, and national 
security functions when it entered into the Union.  Today, Massachusetts can’t negotiate a 
climate treaty with China or India and enforce its provisions as a legally binding matter without 
running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.  Nor can it declare war or competently defend itself 
from attack by outside threats.144  These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal 
government, which has a special duty to protect Massachusetts from injury, not unlike if 
Massachusetts was invaded by a foreign enemy.  Today’s “enemy” is climate change.  
2.  Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp (2012) 
  Consider, too, the climate security implications of a second climate change litigation 
case, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp.  In Kivalina, native Alaskan Villagers sued 
Exxon Mobil and several large fossil fuel producers, alleging that their massive GHG 
emissions eroded their land and threatened their village with imminent destruction.145  The 
plaintiffs, who reside on a barrier reef in the Arctic Circle, are uniquely vulnerable to climate 
change’s impact.  Sea ice protects the village from storm waves and surges, yet climate change 
is rapidly melting the protective sea ice.  Massive erosion is occurring in the village, harming 
critical infrastructure, and threatening the city with imminent detestation.146  If the village is 
not relocated immediately, it may cease to exist.147 
3.  Our Children’s Trust:  Juliana v. United States  (2016). 
 
142 Id. at 519. 
143 Id. at 522. 
144 Of course, Massachusetts does possess a state-based National Guard that reports to the State 
Governor. 
145 Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Corp. 696 F. 3d 849 (2012).   
146 Id.  at 853. 
147 Id. “[I]t is believed that the right combination of storm events could flood the entire village at any  
time.... Remaining on the island ... is no longer a viable option for the community.” U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO 04–142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT 
FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 30, 32 (2003). 
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 Finally, in Juliana v. United States,  the plaintiffs (children-litigants) sued the federal 
government for violating their constitutional rights to an environment.  In Juliana, the litigants 
argue that “this is a constitutional case of great urgency about the physical and emotional 
security of American youth.”148  In doing so, the litigants argue that the Government violated 
their due process by harming their personal security and bodily integrity.149  In making a novel 
substantive due process claim before the Ninth Circuit, the litigants assert that the United 
States infringed upon their right to life and personal security by knowingly authorizing the 
extraction of fossil fuels, despite knowing of their immense cost.  Further, the litigants point 
to numerous national security harms to include storm surges, hurricanes, droughts, wildfires, 
and a generalized “national security destabilization” throughout various regions of the 
world.150  Once again, Juliana showcases how climate change shines light on overlapping values 
between environmental law and national security law.  After all, both seek to safeguard the 
security, health, and welfare of each of each citizen. 
III. Is Climate Change a National Emergency? 
In the face of congressional inaction on climate change, commentators have begun to 
speculate that emergency action may ultimately be necessary to reduce our GHG emissions.151  
Do existing statutes allow the President, independent of Congress, to ex ante declare climate 
change a “national emergency?” 152   A discussed below, Congress has already delegated 
emergency authority to the President via the 1976 National Emergencies Act (NEA).153  Using 
the National Emergencies Act to address climate change gained new attention in February 
2019 when it was invoked by President Trump for a non-traditional threat when he declared 
that the “current situation at the southern border presents a border security and humanitarian 
crisis that threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national emergency.”154  
 
148 Id. at 2.  
149 Juliana v. U.S., Answering Brief (Case No. 18-36802) (Feb. 22, 2019).  
150 Juliana v. U.S., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1265 (D. Or. 2016) (summarizing the injuries asserted by the 
children-litigants). 
151 See, e.g., Jackie Flynn Mogensen, Five Things a Democratic President Could do by Declaring a National 
Emergency Over Climate Change, MOTHER JONES, Mar. 8, 2019.  A related question —  Is climate change a threat to 
international peace and security? — is beyond the scope of this paper.  In recent years, the Security Council has 
shown an increased willingness to proactively address non-traditional security threats beyond aggression and 
inter-state armed conflict.  This suggests a greater role for the UNSC on matters of environmental and climate 
security. 
152 Mogensen, supra note 150.  
153 The National Emergency Act of 1976, Public Law 94-412, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651. 
154 Presidential Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of 
the United States, Feb. 15, 2019.   
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While this border emergency declaration was (and remains) enormously controversial, it 
nevertheless showcased how existing law grants the President broad discretion to utilize 
existing emergency authorities to combat traditional and non-traditional security threats.  Since 
President Trump’s border declaration, commentators, scholars, and politicians have begun to 
speculate whether climate change could potentially be declared a national emergency by a 
future President.155  In what follows, I describe the scope of the National Emergencies Act 
and address what measures a future President could take to combat climate change.  While the 
President is afforded broad discretion to declare a national emergency to address wide-ranging 
threats, a climate emergency declaration will have difficulty in implementing follow-on 
measures based upon existing case law.156  
A. The National Emergencies Act and Climate Change 
Under the NEA, the President has broad authority to declare a national emergency:  
With respect to acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of 
a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is 
authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall 
immediately be transmitted to Congress and published in the Federal 
Register.157 
 
Once a national emergency is declared, the President can turn to existing delegated 
legal authorities baked into the text of other statutes.  In essence, an emergency declaration 
breathes life into over 120 statutory provisions covering a wide variety of issues.  The Brennan 
Center for Justice at New York University Law School categorized these statutes as addressing 
federal employees (58); asset seizure, control, and transfer (27); military and national defense 
(23); land management (12); public health (9); and international relations (7).  There are no 
emergency provisions that address climate change specifically and the existing environmental 
provisions actually suspend environmental protections during times of national emergency.158 
 
155 Following President Trump’s emergency declaration, Senator Marco Rubio stated, “We have to be 
careful about endorsing broad uses of executive power.  Tomorrow the national emergency might be climate 
change.”  Sen. Marco Rubio, CNBC (R-FL).  Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) wrote, “[T]he Pentagon, Congress 
and this administration have all said climate change is a serious threat to national security . . . [w]ill the next 
President bypass Congress and declare an emergency?  The door can swing both ways.” Scott Waldman, Next 
president could declare a climate emergency, GOP fears, E&E NEWS, Jan. 11, 2019.  
156 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
157 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (a).  
158  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (f) (authorizing the President to make a determination (following a 
Governor’s petition) that a national or regional emergency exists, thereby suspending any part of a state Clean 
Air Act implementation plan). John Schwartz & Tik Rook, Could a Future President Declare a Climate Emergency?, 
THE N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2019.  
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The National Emergencies Act (NEA) was passed in the aftermath of Vietnam and 
Watergate, following congressional concern that too much emergency power was already 
vested in the executive branch.159  Further, once a national emergency was declared, presidents 
were reluctant to “undeclare” them.  For example, President Truman issued a declaration of 
national emergency in 1950 in response to hostilities in Korea that remained in effect 
throughout the Vietnam War.160  
The term “emergency” is not defined in statute and Congress provides the President 
with broad discretion in making this determination.  Congress can terminate the emergency 
by concurrent resolution.161  The NEA envisions that Congress would meet within six months 
of a national emergency declaration “to determine whether that emergency shall be 
terminated.”162  But since the NEA’s passage, Congress has largely  failed to follow-through 
on terminating prior emergencies.  Since the National Emergencies Act was passed in 1976, it 
has been invoked 41 times and there are currently 31 emergencies in effect.163  Further, the 
NEA authorizes Congress to terminate the emergency by concurrent resolution,164 but this 
legislative veto authority was declared unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.165   
As a foundational matter, the NEA was passed to curtail, cleanup, and clarify the 
executive branch’s emergency authorities — which had expanded throughout the mid-20th 
century.  The National Emergencies Act was passed to expand and delegate further authorities 
to the President.166    
 
159 For an outstanding summary of the legislative background of the National Emergencies Act, see 
HAROLD C. RELYEA, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS, CONG. RES. SERV., AUG. 30, 2007. [hereinafter CRS 
EMERGENCY]. 
160  CRS EMERGENCY, supra note 159, at 8.  The NEA kept in place four national emergency 
proclamations that were issued pursuant to a President’s Article II constitutional authority in 1933, 1950, 1970, 
and 1971.  
161 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (a)(1).  But this concurrent resolution amounted to a “legislative veto” provision.  
This was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).   
This provision was amended in 1985 to substitute a “joint resolution” to terminate a national emergency.  99 
Stat. 405, 448 (1985). See also CRS EMERGENCY, supra note 158, at 12.   
162 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (b). 
163 Kate Aronoff, Climate Change, Not Border Security, is our Real National Emergency, THE INTERCEPT, JAN. 
28, 2019 (quoting the analysis of Jeffrey Toobin).   Under U.S. domestic law, there are four emergency framework 
statutes: (1) The National Emergencies Act of 1976; (2) The Public Health Service Act of 1944;  (3) Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief Act and Emergency Act of 1988; and (4) Defense Drawdown Act of 1961.  Separate 
from these four framework statutes, there are other statutory provisions that become available once the President 
declares a national emergency.    
164 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (a)(2). 
165 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
166 50 U.S.C. § 1601. .  Effective two years after the statute’s approval, the NEA terminated “all powers 
or authorities possessed by the President [or] any other officer or employee of the Federal government . . . as a 
result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency . . .”Id.  
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Since the NEA’s passage, presidents have invoked its activities liberally, regardless of 
political party.  President Carter declared two national emergencies in 1979 addressing Iranian 
government property — that emergency remains in effect.167  President Reagan declared six 
national emergencies in his two presidential terms, President George H.W. Bush declared five, 
and President Clinton declared sixteen national emergencies ranging from blocking the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regulating the anchorage and movement of 
vessels with respect to Cuba.168 
B. Climate Change as a National Emergency? 
In what follows, I address the existing statutory framework currently in place that 
could be utilized by future Presidents to address climate change as a national emergency.  The 
analysis focuses on the National Emergencies Act as a mechanism to address climate change 
as a national emergency before any specific climactic event.  The Public Health Service Act and 
Stafford Act are relevant for fully understanding the authorities in place in the aftermath of 
extreme weather events and public health emergencies.169  Of course, outside of these existing 
statutory grants of authority following an emergency declaration, the President possesses 
independent national security power to defend the nation against any threat (however defined) 
under the U.S. Constitution.170    
Surveying the field of available emergency provisions, there are no explicit provisions 
that would authorize the seizure of GHG-emitting power plants, limit vehicle miles traveled, 
or otherwise reduce the amount of GHG emissions from different industries.  Contrary to the 
underlying goals of a national climate emergency declarations — that would seek an abatement 
 
167 Exec. Order 12,170 Blocking Iranian Government Property, 3 C.F.R., 1979 Comp., pp. 457-458.  
168 CRS EMERGENCY, supra note 159, at 14-15. 
169 The Stafford Act authorizes a Governor to petition the President for a declaration of major disaster 
or emergency when she reaches “a finding that a disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response 
is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.”  
42 U.S.C. § 5170.  It defines emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the 
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to 
protect property and public health and safety to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the 
United States.”42 U.S.C. § 4122.  The Public Health Service Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to declare a public health emergency.  This was most recently invoked in 2017 when President Trump 
instructed the HHS Secretary to combat the opioid crisis. Pres. Memo, Combatting the National Drug and Opioid 
Crisis, 82 FR 50305, Oct. 26, 2017. 
170 U.S. CONST. art. II.  There is no comprehensive emergency regime within the Constitution.  Congress 
has the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus “when in Case of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”  The Constitution provides “for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”  For an overview of the President’s authority as Commander in 
Chief to combat climate change, see Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (2015).  
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of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions — some of the existing provisions loosen or eliminate 
environmental restrictions during time of declared national emergency.  For example, under 
the Clean Air Act, the Governor of a State may petition the President to determine that a 
national or regional energy emergency exists of such severity that a temporary suspension of 
part of the Clean Air Act implementation plan.171  The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 1975 waives the 30-day comment period on proposed rules and regulations “if the President 
finds that such waiver is necessary to act expeditiously during an emergency affecting the 
national security of the United States.”172  Further, these emergency provisions are largely 
based on responding to sudden changes where Congress lacks adequate time to act.  One of 
the few existing environmental-related emergency provisions that could potentially assist in a 
climate change emergency addresses the prohibition. 173   Of course, ex post emergency 
declarations following natural disasters via emergency declarations such as the Stafford Act 
remain legally valid options.  Nevertheless, there are several non-explicit provisions that an 
innovative President could arguably turn to in the event she desires to declare a climate change 
a national emergency.   
First, a law addressing governmental oil leases on the outer continental shelf could 
suspend offshore oil drilling operations in the United States’ continental shelf.174  This obscure 
provision in natural resource regulation requires oil leases to have clauses that suspend the 
lease (and, hence oil production) during national emergencies.175   
 Second, the Secretary of Transportation has broad delegated authority to coordinate 
transportation during national emergencies. 176  The transportation sector is an enormous 
source of greenhouse gas emissions.177  Read broadly, if climate change is declared a national 
emergency, the Secretary of Transportation could restrict the trucking and automobile 
industry’s greenhouse gas emissions. This could potentially be used to decrease GHG 
emissions from auto and truck use on federally-funded highways.   
 
171 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (f). 
172 42 U.S.C. § 6393(a)(2)(A). 
173  7 U.S.C. § 5712(c) (2012). 
174 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
175 43 U.SC. § 1341. Thank you to Professor Daniel Farber for first alerting me to this provision. 
176 49 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).  
177  Envt’l Protection Agency, Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Aug 6, 
2019).  
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Third, the emergency military construction statute  — the same law being invoked to 
fund a border wall —  is another potential tool to invest in climate adaptation measures at 
military installations vulnerable to storm surge and sea level rise.178  While the law is not 
focused on environmental or climate change, there exists a valid legal basis for investment in 
climate resilient infrastructure. After all, the law requires that any construction must “require 
use of the armed forces” and be “necessary to support such use of the armed forces.”179  
Relatedly, there are provisions that authorize the re-programming of funds in the event of a 
declared national emergency.  This could serve as a vehicle to fund climate adaptation 
measures in localities particularly vulnerable to sea level rise.180   
Fourth, the President has the authority to extend loan guarantees to critical industries 
in national emergencies181  and respond to industrial shortfalls. 182  These authorities could 
potentially be utilized to support renewable energy and electric vehicle production. 
A climate change emergency declaration would be enormously controversial and 
would likely be the subject of litigation, primarily from the fossil fuel industry.  Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 33 U.S. 579 (1952) would serve as the starting point in weighing the 
success of any litigation stemming from a climate-emergency declaration.183  The President 
would likely assert that she is acting in the first of Justice Jackson’s groupings, arguing that she 
was merely acting pursuant to the National Emergencies Act and accompanying statutes — 
“express or implied authorization.”184  Further, the President would argue, Congress had 
completely failed to amend or update the National Emergencies Act;  nor has Congress taken 
an active role in terminating prior emergencies — is this not evidence of a “gloss on Executive 
Power?”185  Hypothetical litigants, likely from the fossil fuel industry, would instead argue that 
 
178 10 U.S.C. § 2808 (2012). 
179 Id.  
180 In the event of a declaration of war or a declaration by the President of a national emergency in 
accordance with the National Emergencies Act (90 Stat. 1255; 50 U.S.C. 1601) that requires or may require use 
of the Armed Forces, the Secretary, without regard to any other provision of law, may (1) terminate or defer the 
construction, operation, maintenance, or repair of any Department of the Army civil works project that he deems 
not essential to the national defense, and (2) apply the resources of the Department of the Army’s civil works 
program, including funds, personnel, and equipment, to construct or assist in the construction, operation, 
maintenance, and repair of authorized civil works, military construction, and civil defense projects that are 
essential to the national defense. 33 U.S.C. § 2293. 
181 50 U.S.C. § 4531 
182 50 U.S.C. § 4533. 
183 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
184 Id. at 636 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
185 Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
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the President’s powers were at the “lowest ebb” — Congress had yet to pass climate change 
legislation and had not provided explicit or implicit authority to the President to address 
climate change via the Clean Air Act or other environmental statutes. 186  Challenges to 
Presidential authority will be bolstered if the President uses her authority to seize domestic 
coal plants or elements of the fossil fuel industry within the United States.  After all, Justice 
Jackson would “indulge the widest latitude of interpretation” when the “instruments of 
national force . . .[are] turned against the outside world.”  But when this power is “turned 
inward . . . it should have no such indulgence.”187 
Nevertheless, there may be a rhetorical advantage of declaring a “climate emergency” 
without actuating specific powers under the National Emergencies Act.  At the time of this 
writing, Senator Sanders (I-VT) just proposed a new climate emergency resolution, exclaiming 
that there must be “massive-scale mobilization to halt, reverse, and address [climate change’s] 
consequences and causes.”188  While the Senate Resolution makes clear that “nothing in this 
concurrent resolution constitutes a declaration of a national emergency for purposes of any 
Act of Congress,” it seizes upon the climate emergency vernacular to highlight the severity of 
the threat and provide a potential means to rally support and spur action. 
IV. Climate Change & National Security:     
Weighing Opportunities and Risks 
 
There is increasingly an alignment in values between climate change and national 
security.  Human-caused climate change is accelerating environmental degradation, causing 
drought, famine, quickly leading to humanitarian crisis.189  Unlike existing national security 
waivers built into environmental law, the “securitization” of climate change seeks to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions and provide for greater environmental protections.  Yet the climate 
 
186 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
187 Id. at 645-46 (Jackson, J. concurring).  
188 S. Con. Res. ____ (116th Cong.) (Sen. Sanders I-VT) (“Whereas the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and the intelligence community have identified climate change as a threat to national 
security, and the Department of Homeland Security views climate change as a top homeland security risk.”) 
189 Consider the case of Syria, a nation that suffered a drought immediately before a costly Civil War, 
displacing 1.5 million people within Syria. A domestic crisis quickly became a regional crisis.  And a regional crisis 
soon became a global crisis. Gregg Badicheck, The Threat Divider:  Expanding the Role of the Military in Climate Change 
Adaptation, 41 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 139, 144-45 (2016). For example, climate change severely exacerbated a five-
year drought in Syria that “contributed to massive agriculture failures and population displacements.”  CTR. FOR 
NAVAL ANALYSIS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 13-18 (2007), available at 
https://www.cna.org/reports/climate [hereinafter CNA 2007]. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Response to Congressional 
Inquiry on National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate 4 (Jul. 23, 2015). 
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security conceptualization is not without risk.  In what follows, I highlight the numerous ways 
that this climate change-national security connection presents both opportunities and risks.       
A. Opportunity:  Intelligence and National Security as Climate Change Validators and Norm 
Entrepreneurs 
 
Unfortunately, climate change science is heavily politicized, undermining 
governmental action.  Despite the IPCC’s overwhelming conclusion that global climate change 
is caused by human activity, a recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that only 67 
percent of Americans believe there is “solid evidence” of “global warming.”190  This is heavily 
divided along political party lines.  Within the United States, there remains significant 
skepticism concerning the veracity of anthropogenic climate change despite the overwhelming 
scientific evidence outlined in Part I.  This has influenced the public’s perception of the threats 
posed by climate change, thwarting action on climate.   
But the national security, intelligence, and military communities can act as a credible, 
non-partisan information broker.  And there are hopeful signs that the national security 
community’s increasing interest in climate change may help reverse some of this skepticism 
and validate climate change as an important national security issue.  This can help drive 
resources and research.191  Indeed, the national security community can serve as a potential 
bulwark in validating the existing science and highlighting the importance of climate change 
as an issue that deserves our collective attention.192   
Take the U.S. military, a critical subset of the national security community.  As an 
institution, the American public places a high degree of confidence in the military as a non-
partisan arbiter of the threats facing the nation, however defined.  This, in part, stems from 
the military’s apolitical nature.193 And the intelligence community (heavy staffed with military 
members) is viewed as a credible, non-partisan voice on the threats facing the nation and the 
world.   
The military can play an important role in changing societal norms and as a validator 
of climate science.  The military is a largely apolitical institution that enjoys high favorability 
ratings with the American public.  A recent Gallup poll showed that 72% of people had “a 
 
190 Light, supra note 75, at 1780. 
191 There appears to be a strong historical basis for this. In the early 19th century following the War of 
1812, federal funding for roads enjoyed strong political support when it was connected to military necessity. 
192 See generally Light, supra note 75. 
193 For example, uniformed members are legally prohibited from having an active role in political 
activities.  DEP’T OF DEF. INST.,  POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCE (Feb. 2008). 
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great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military but only 12% of the population felt 
the same about Congress.194  The military has a deep planning culture that manages risk — not 
unlike environmental law’s risk-based approach to conservation and natural resource 
management.  At its core, climate change is like any other national security risk.  We know it 
is occurring, but we do not know precisely how it will affect us.  As climate change transforms 
the operational environment, the military has the duty and responsibility to protect the nation’s 
national security interests, regardless of their source. 
Outside the environmental context, the military has often been at the vanguard of 
important societal and policy changes.  For example, President Truman issued Executive 
Order 9981 in 1948, abolishing segregation in the military sixteen years prior to the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act.195  Many scholars have concluded that contact between white and black 
soldiers in the U.S. military correlated with greater support for racial integration in civilian 
life.196 By extension, greater engagement and contact with the national security implications of 
climate change may have similar effects.   
Conceptualizing climate change as a national security issue can play an important role 
in validating climate change as an issue that demands our attention and resources.  While 
climate science has been subject to intense scrutiny and politicization, the national security and 
military intelligence reports addressing threats caused by climate change remain largely (but 
not entirely) resistant to politicized attacks.  Professor Light has described the military as the 
“unequivocal validator of climate science.” 197   
Framing issues as bona fide national security challenges can similarly be a powerful 
linguistic tool that drives resources and public perceptions.   Climate change language has 
slowly become “securitized.”198  For example, former Secretary of State John Kerry recently 
exclaimed that climate change was a “weapon of mass destruction” while former Defense 
 
194   Jim Norman, GALLUP,  Americans Give Military Branches High Marks, 
(https://news.gallup.com/poll/211112/americans-give-military-branches-similar-high-marks.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2019). 
195 Exec. Order 9981 (Jul. 26, 1948). 
196 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Wilson, The American Soldier Revisited: Race Relations and the Military, 59 
SOC. SCI. Q. 451, 465 (1975)  
197 Light, supra note 75, at 1797-98. See also Sarah Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 879 (2014).  
198 Richard Lazarus, Combatting Climate Change, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 142, 154 (2013).  The preamble of 
the Paris Agreement states, “[t]he need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate 
change on the basis of the best available evidence . . .” (emphasis provided).  Jeff McMahon, Former Defense 
Secretary Compares Climate Change to Nuclear War, FORBES, Dec. 9, 2018.  
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Secretary William Perry recently compared climate change to a slowly unfolding “nuclear 
war.”199  And some climate scientists and politicians are now urging a “wartime footing” to 
radically transform the economy in the face of challenges posed by climate change.  
Representative Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Markey (D-MA) have explicitly 
acknowledged climate change’s national security impacts in their Green New Deal proposal, 
stating that climate change: 
constitutes a direct threat to the national security of the United States . . .by   
impacting the economic, environmental, and social stability of countries and  
communities around the world and by acting as a threat multiplier.200 
 
President Obama stated that we “must do more to combat climate change.” 201  
Professor Lazarus has written of “Presidential Combat Against Climate Change,” highlighting 
the apolitical nature of military leaders that only care about real science, not just “political” 
science.202   
Increasingly, national security preferences and desired outcomes are aligned with 
environmental values and outcomes.  Professor Light and others have accurately described 
national security as a public good akin to clean air and water:  “it is a classic public good that 
is too costly and unwieldy for individuals to provide for themselves, and it is impossible to 
exclude individuals from enjoying it once it is provided.”203  National security law seeks to 
protect and preserve national interests, protect the lives of its military members, and be 
prepared for future conflicts.  The precautionary principle is a bedrock component of 
environmental law that seeks to protect the environment.  National security law and military 
planning more generally take a similar approach. Culturally, military planners and decision-
makers are comfortable making decisions without complete intelligence and facts 
 
199 Jeff McMahon, Former Defense Secretary Compares Climate Change to Nuclear War, FORBES, Dec. 9, 2018. 
And leaders of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have also utilized a more securitized language in their 
discourse about the threats posed by climate change on their future. 
200 116th Congress, H.R. “Green New Deal.” “Recognizing the duty of the federal government to create 
a Green New Deal.” (Rep. Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Rep. Markey (D-MA)).  Using this militarized climate 
language is not without controversy. Representative Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) have declared the threat of climate 
change our generation’s World War II.  Kate Aronoff, Climate Change, Not Border Security, is our Real National 
Emergency, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 28, 2019.  In addition, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) has proposed climate 
legislation addressing climate change’s security impacts. 
201 President Obama, State of the Union Address, Feb 12. 2013. 
202 Richard Lazarus, Presidential Combat Against Climate Change, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 142, 154 (2013). 
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted the threat language in its preamble, recognizing the need for 
an effective and progressive response of climate change based on the basis of the best available scientific 
knowledge. 
203 Light, supra note 75, at 1797. 
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In the face of the politicization of climate science and official climate denial by several 
high-ranking political leaders, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the national 
security intelligence community continue to report on and acknowledge the myriad national 
security threats posed by climate change.  These intelligence reports increasingly engage with 
climate science reports.   
There is certain durability to the climate change as a national security issue that 
transcends politics. For example, DoD guidance on planning for climate change remains in 
effect.  The 2014 Climate Adaptation Roadmap stated that climate change “will affect the 
Department of Defense’s ability to defend the Nation and poses immediate threats to U.S. 
national security.”204  The former Pacific Commander, Admiral Locklear, publicly stated that 
climate change is the greatest long-term threat in the Pacific region.205  Former Secretary of 
Defense, James Mattis, has publicly spoken about the threats posed by climate change and in 
his confirmation hearing to serve as the Secretary of Defense openly addressed climate change 
as a national security threat.206   
The military has a deep planning culture that takes a risk-based approach.207 Mission 
planning includes “identification and assessment of the effects of climate change on the DoD 
mission” and “anticipating and managing any risks that develop as a result of climate change 
to build resilience.”208  It must continuously weigh uncertainty and wrestle with risk.  Planning 
for changes in the operational environment is a defining aspect of the military planning 
process.  The military now defines climate change within existing doctrine as: 
Variations in average weather conditions that persist over multiple decades or longer 
that encompass increases and decreases in temperature, shifts in precipitation, and 
changing risk of severe weather events.209  
 
 
204 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ROADMAP (2014).  
205 See, e.g., Bryan Bender, Chief of U.S. Pacific forces calls climate biggest worry, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2013 
(quoting Admiral Sam Locklear who called climate change the biggest long-term security threat in the Pacific 
theater). 
206 “Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operating today.  It 
is appropriate for the Combatant Commands to incorporate drivers of instability that impact the security 
environment in their areas into planning.” 
207 See Light, supra note 75 (hypothesizing that “linking a reduction in reliance on fossil fuels to the value 
of promoting national security . . . has the potential to change individual attitudes and beliefs . . . about energy 
use and climate change.”) 
208 Id. at 3. 
209 DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 92, at 36. 
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Within the military, understanding the operational environment210 is crucial to military 
strategy and success.  Today, military planners must consider and take into account future 
changes to the operational environment.  As environmental law and climate change law have a 
heavy emphasis to changes in the physical environment, national security planners have 
historically had a heavy focus and emphasis on planning for changes to the operational 
environment.  Climate change is already dramatically transforming the operational 
environment.  Consider climate change’s dramatic impact in the Arctic, and what that will 
mean for climate security matters.  Climate change is already dramatically impacting the Arctic, 
which is warming two to three times faster than the rest of the world.211  Certain “black swan” 
tipping-point events —such as marine sheet instability in Antarctica or massive loss of the 
Greenland ice sheet—could result in multi-meter rise in sea level rise over hundreds or 
thousands of years.  Recent scientific report indicate that the Antarctic ice sheet is melting as 
much as six times faster than the rest of the world and oceans are warming at a much faster 
rate than previously estimated.212 These instabilities could be triggered this century as the 
temperatures rise around 1.5 degrees Celsius to 2.0 degrees Celsius.213 
Even the United Nations Security Council has begun to address climate change as a 
threat to international peace and security, holding several high-level meetings to better 
understand the threat posed by climate change.214  While the Security Council has stopped 
short of making a legal determination that climate change is a “threat to international peace 
and security”—thereby actuating certain powers—it has discussed climate change’s 
destabilizing effects in two resolutions. Two recent UN Security Council Resolutions 
specifically highlighted the “adverse effects of climate change and ecological change” in 
destabilizing the security situation in both Lake Chad Basin and the Somalia. 215  
 
210 The term “operational environment” is defined to as “a composite of the circumstances, and 
influences that affect the employment of capabilities on the decisions of the commander.”  DoD Dictionary, 
supra note 92, at 173. 
211 For an overview of the stress that climate change is placing on the physical environment in the Arctic, 
see generally Robert V. Percival & Mark P. Nevitt, Polar Opposites:  Assessing the State of Environmental Law in the World’s 
Polar Regions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1655 (2018). 
212 See, e.g, Chris Mooney, Antarctic Ice Loss Has Tripled in a Decade.  If that Continues, We are in Serious 
Trouble, WASH. POST, Jun. 13, 2018.  
213 UNIPCC 1.5 REPORT, supra note 5, at SPM-9. 
214  Leila Mead, UN Security Council Addresses Climate Change as a Security Risk, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Jul 31, 2018.  
215 UNSCR 2349 (¶ 26), UNSCR 2408 (2017). 
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  In sum, conceptualizing climate change via the lens of national security can potentially 
spur action, or at least maintain existing measures on climate change.  In recent years, the 
executive branch and Congress has largely undone many of the climate change efforts from 
the previous Administration.   Yet Congress has begun to take steps within the yearly defense 
budget to address climate change impacts on national security infrastructure. 216    The 
Republican-controlled Congress recently required that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
issue a report on the “vulnerabilities to the military resulting from climate change over the 
next 20 years.”217  Further, while the current President has not taken proactive steps to address 
climate change, many of the Obama-era guidance on climate change is still in effect, to include 
the DoD climate adaptation roadmap and guidance on construction in flood zones.   
B. Risks:  Co-opting Environmental Law – National Security Expansion without a Limiting 
Principle 
 
 But conceptualizing climate change as a security issue is not without risk.  While both 
areas of the law are relatively new, their genesis and evolution could not be more different.  
National security law came into fruition in the aftermath of World War II with the passage of 
the 1947 National Security Act.  National security law is much more a top-down, hierarchical, 
institution-based area of law — think of the DoD, CIA, and Office of Director of national 
Intelligence.  In contrast, environmental law emerged in the 1960s from the “bottom-up” in 
response to ecological devastation described by environmental pioneers such as Rachel 
Carson.  There may be mutual distrust between these two areas of law and communities that 
must be mended.   
  Further, the executive branch has expanded the scope and breadth of national security 
matters, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War.218 In recent years, the President has 
sought to expand conceptions of national security in international trade and a border “crisis” 
between the U.S. and Mexico.   In doing so, it has which has sought to increase its authority 
and widen the definition of what is considered a national emergency.  Congress, in turn,  has 
 
216 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  
217 Section 335, Langevin Amendment; Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Appropriations Act.  
218  ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING 
(2017); HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990).  
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yet to define national security and courts have struggled to place limitations on national 
security’s left and right limits.219  
  National security is a powerful and increasingly capacious term that the executive 
branch often relies upon when it desires a certain policy preference.   There is a risk in diluting 
this term to lose all of its meaning.  In recent years, we have seen national security rationales 
used in the areas of immigration, trade, and elsewhere at the expense of personal liberty.  Is 
the convergence of environmental, climate change and national security law part of a broader 
continuation of national security casting a wide shadow over a cast of issues?  And is there a 
concern that national security is so encompassing that it is beginning to lose all its meaning? 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
Not only is climate change a “super wicked” environmental problem — it also 
accelerates existing national security threats, acting as both a “threat accelerant” and “catalyst 
for conflict.”   Climate change will force us to think anew about how different areas of law 
engage with each other.   It acts as a destabilizer of the physical environmental and existing 
law while also connecting areas of law that were historically not in close conversation.    While 
environmental law and the emerging field of climate change law have historically been in 
conflict with national security law, that is slowly changing.   Climate science makes clear that 
we must massively reduce GHG emissions from all sources this century or face devastating 
security consequences.  National security and intelligence reports reinforces what science is 
telling us.   We will need to invest in a massive, scalable energy transformation to secure a 
more livable future.  And Sea level rise, storm surge, and extreme weather — all exacerbated 
by climate change — threatens our sovereignty and national security in new and dramatic 
ways.   
 
219 See Laura Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1577-80 (2011) 
(describing the difficulties in defining “national security”). Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
1417, 1423 (2012). Under existing military joint  doctrine, “national security” is defined as:  “A collective term 
encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: (a) a 
military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; (b) a favorable foreign relations 
position; (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or 
without, overt or covert.”  DoD Dictionary, supra note 92, at 162. 
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In the absence of a binding legal framework to comprehensively address climate 
change’s enormous impacts, policymakers may increasingly turn to the full menu of legal 
authorities that are available, such as the National Emergencies Act. But this, too, will be 
enormously controversial and risky for democratic governance as it bypasses  Nevertheless, 
there is a growing space between the actions that are needed and the actions that are actually 
undertaken on climate.   As climate change increasingly engages with the national security 
community, we must be aware of the risks and opportunities in addressing matters of climate 
security.  
 
  
